Many studies investigating the effect of human social connectivity structures (networks) and human behavioral adaptations on the spread of infectious diseases have assumed either a static connectivity structure or a network which adapts itself in response to the epidemic (adaptive networks). However, human social connections are inherently dynamic or time varying. Furthermore, the spread of many infectious diseases occur on a time scale comparable to the time scale of the evolving network structure. Here we aim to quantify the effect of human behavioral adaptations on the spread of asymptomatic infectious diseases on time varying networks. We perform a full stochastic analysis using a continuous time Markov chain approach for calculating the outbreak probability, mean epidemic duration, epidemic reemergence probability, etc. Additionally, we use mean-field theory for calculating epidemic thresholds. Theoretical predictions are verified using extensive simulations. Our studies have uncovered the existence of an "adaptive threshold," i.e., when the ratio of susceptibility (or infectivity) rate to recovery rate is below the threshold value, adaptive behavior can prevent the epidemic. However, if it is above the threshold, no amount of behavioral adaptations can prevent the epidemic. Our analyses suggest that the interaction patterns of the infected population play a major role in sustaining the epidemic. Our results have implications on epidemic containment policies, as awareness campaigns and human behavioral responses can be effective only if the interaction levels of the infected populace are kept in check.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our modern societies are best described as complex systems consisting of a large number of interacting components. Due to this underlying complexity, understanding and containing the spread of biological diseases in human societies becomes a challenge. In the last decade, mathematical modeling techniques [1] and agent-based simulations [2] have allowed researchers to gain a deeper understanding of such processes. Traditional mathematical models assumed a homogeneous population where individuals contacted others randomly, thus ignoring the connectivity structure of individuals [3] . Due to the availability of high-quality data, researchers have unearthed detailed connectivity structures of various complex systems [4, 5] and have represented them as networks. For example, in social networks, individuals are described as nodes, and relationships between them are represented by links.
The discovery of network structures led to a detailed study of their effects on the epidemic spreading process. Mathematical analysis using mean-field theory has revealed valuable insights, such as lack of an epidemic threshold on scalefree networks [6, 7] . These studies assumed a connectivity structure which evolved on a time scale much larger than the time scale of the diffusion process. This assumption allowed the system to be modeled as a static network, which is reasonable for networks that evolve very slowly compared to the time scale of the diffusion process. Examples of this include the spread of computer viruses on the World Wide Web network or traffic dynamics on transportation networks. Such a time-scale separation assumption also holds reasonably well in epidemic models for diseases which spread rapidly [8] , e.g., SARS [9] or the spread of Mycoplasma pneumoniae in psychiatric wards [10] . * bkotnis@dese.iisc.ernet.in † kuri@dese.iisc.ernet.in
The other limit of time-scale separation occurs when the epidemic process evolves at a time scale much larger than the underlying contact structure. This is equivalent to every individual randomly contacting every other individual, leading to homogeneous mixing among the population.
However, many networks evolve at a time scale comparable to that of the diffusion process. Examples are the spread of a Bluetooth-based virus on smart phones [11] , information spreading during an emergency [12] , and information diffusion in ad hoc networks [13] . In the context of biological epidemics, the spread of various sexually transmitted Infections [14, 15] , slow infections such as tuberculosis (TB) [16] , and foot and mouth disease among cattle [17] are transmitted at a time scale comparable to the network evolution.
Human behavioral response to the epidemic is another important phenomenon that affects epidemic dynamics. The awareness of an epidemic through news and other media can change the underlying connectivity structure. This change can be either due to self-initiated precautions, such as avoiding contact, or due to government-mandated programs such as closing schools, airports, and other services. In recent years various studies have modeled this adaptive behavior; see Ref. [18] for a recent review. In a few studies [19] , the network is considered to be static, and susceptibility of individuals changes with number of infected neighbors. This approach is further refined by extending the standard susceptible infected susceptible or susceptible infected recovered compartmental model to include behavior-related compartments, such as a fear compartment [20] [21] [22] [23] . Individuals shift to these compartments at a rate proportional to the infected populace. Parameters in these compartments differ from other compartments, such as reduction of susceptibility in the fear compartment.
Thus, the effect of adaptive behavior must be included in epidemic models that do not exhibit time-scale separation. To this end, many studies [24] [25] [26] have analyzed the effect of adaptive behavior on the disease and the contact structure using adaptive networks. Healthy individuals break their connections with infected individuals and reconnect to other healthy individuals for avoiding contact with the infected. Variations of this model include rewiring and connecting to random individuals [27] or simply breaking contacts with the infected [28] . Adaptive networks do not assume time-scale separation; i.e., the infection spreads at a time scale comparable to the evolution of the network.
However, this rewiring dynamic assumes that healthy individuals can recognize infected individuals in order to break contact with them. This is possible when the disease is symptomatic. However, if the disease is asymptomatic or if it has a large asymptomatic stage like TB or human papilloma virus, then the diagnosis of the disease (in the asymptomatic stage) can be carried out only by a medical practitioner after performing a thorough medical examination. In such a scenario healthy individuals may not be able to recognize an infected individual. Thus, disease awareness can be generated only through news, other media, and government advisories. Furthermore, in such models, the underlying network structure evolves only as a response to the epidemic.
The processes responsible for the time evolution of network are not well understood [29] . Changes in network structure can be due to either human behavioral response to the epidemic or due to various other processes. We believe that it is important to consider time varying networks, i.e., networks which change their structure not only due to the epidemic process but also due to other complex processes, as some recent studies [30] [31] [32] [33] have shown that dynamical processes such as random walks behave differently on these networks. These studies have prompted us to investigate the effect of human behavioral adaptations on epidemic dynamics when the disease is asymptomatic and does not exhibit time-scale separation.
Our model incorporates the effects of (1) an asymptomatic or a mildly symptomatic disease, (2) a disease which does not exhibit time-scale separation, (3) adaptive behavior in response to the epidemic, and (4) a contact network which evolves independently of the epidemic.
We use a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model to study the epidemic dynamics and an activity-driven model [31] to account for the changes in contact structure.
All the studies described above have used mean-field theory to analyze their models. This analysis results in a system of deterministic differential equations which describe the epidemic process. Useful analytical insights can be obtained by using mean-field analysis. However, a full stochastic analysis can uncover subtle but important details such as probability of an outbreak, probability distribution of number of infected individuals, etc., which mean-field analysis cannot. In this paper we carry out a detailed stochastic analysis of epidemic dynamics taking into account the effect of the connectivity structure adaptations caused by human behavioral response to the epidemic.
We investigate the effect of adaptive human behavior on epidemic outbreak probability, mean duration of the epidemic, and outbreak size. We also study the effect of adaptive behavior on the epidemic threshold and provide an explicit analytical expression for the epidemic threshold. Additionally, we calculate the probability of epidemic reemergence after strong measures are implemented to curb the epidemic. And finally, we quantify the accuracy of mean field theory in predicting epidemic dynamics and compare it with predictions based on stochastic analysis. The quasi-stationary probability distribution of the number of infected individuals is also computed.
Our investigations reveal that only under certain conditions can adaptive human behavior arrest the epidemic. Contact avoidance strategy pursued by healthy individuals is effective only if the interaction patterns of the infected individuals are within certain limits. We believe that our results can inform policies drafted by governmental and nongovernmental organizations to contain epidemics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces a time varying network model in which each individual interacts with others with a given activity rate. Healthy individuals modify their activity rate as a response to the epidemic. The epidemic is analyzed using continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) theory in Sec. III. Various properties of the epidemic model such as outbreak probability, mean duration of the epidemic, etc., are investigated in Sec. IV. Interpretations and implications of the results are presented in Sec. V, and Sec. VI summarizes our conclusions and main results.
II. MODEL
We use a simple activity-driven model, first proposed in Ref. [31] , to capture the interaction patterns of individuals. The advantage of the activity-driven model is that it allows one to model an individual's interaction rate or activity, which enables the model parameters to be estimated through measurements. Each individual i is characterized by an activity level a i . Activity level is the rate of interaction of the individual, i.e., number of the interactions initiated by the individual, in a fixed time window of length t. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that t is small. The model assumes that the interaction generation process is memoryless. Individuals are represented by nodes, and every interaction an individual initiates is symbolized by a link, allowing the system to be modeled as a network. In this study we do not consider the effects of demography, and hence the total number of individuals, N , is fixed. Network evolution is described by the following process [31] :
(1) At each time step t, the network G t contains N nodes and zero links, i.e., edge set E t = φ.
(2) Each node becomes active with probability a i t. When the node becomes active it picks m nodes uniformly at random and establishes undirected links with them. Nonactive nodes can receive links from active nodes.
(3) At time t + t, all the links in the network G t are removed; thus E t+ t = φ and the process starts again from step 1.
In our analysis we assume that all susceptible nodes have the same activity level a h > 0, and all infected nodes have activity level a inf > 0. The scenario where individuals can have different activity levels is studied through simulations.
In general a inf a h , as mild infection symptoms may result in decreased activity. When individuals with mild symptoms visit a medical practitioner, they become aware of their infected state, which may lead to a reduction in their interaction levels. As a h a inf , this scenario is different from the homogeneous mixing assumption, since the probability of a susceptible contacting a susceptible is different from the probability of a susceptible contacting an infected node.
We use the classical compartmental SIS epidemic spreading model. Individuals are assumed to belong to either the susceptible compartment or the infected compartment. A susceptible node can become infected if any of its infected neighbors transmits the disease. Let β be the probability of transmitting disease. This model allows for the recovery of infected nodes; furthermore, we assume that the infection is nonfatal. Recovered nodes become susceptible and can be reinfected. Let μ be the rate of recovery for each node, i.e., each node recovers with probability μ t in time t.
Since the disease is asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic, individuals will gain information about the epidemic only through news, Internet, and government advisories and announcements, but not through contact with infected individuals. We assume that this information depends on the number of infected individuals. Additionally, we assume that all healthy individuals will show the same response to the epidemic [19] .
We use the exponential model in Ref. [19] to model the behavioral response. Let I (t) and S(t) be the number of infected and susceptible individuals at time t. We replace the activity level of healthy population a h with a sus (I ) = a h e −δ·I (t) where δ is the risk perception factor, which models the perceived risk felt by healthy individuals. An exponential function is used to model the nonlinearity of the response as the awareness results from news and other media [19] . Individuals who have contracted the disease may receive information about their condition through a routine medical checkup. Such knowledge may drive them to reduce their activity level (a inf a h ); however, they will not perceive a risk of being infected since they have knowledge of their condition.
III. ANALYSIS
We use a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) to analyze the epidemic process.
The network evolves on a time scale comparable to that of the epidemic process. In our analysis we assume that the two time scales are the same [30, 31] . The network formation process happens every t time units, and since the recovery process should also have the same time scale, we assume that in time t, each infected node recovers with probability μ t. For t → 0, it can be shown that the recovery process becomes a Poisson process (see Appendix A for details). The probability that two infected nodes will recover simultaneously in time t = μ 2 ( t) 2 is negligible since t is very small. Therefore the probability that one infected node recovers out of a population of I infected nodes is given by I μ t + o( t).
Since the epidemic and network evolution have the same time scale, we assume that during time interval t, an infected node can pass on the infection to another susceptible node with probability β.
P{a susceptible node gets infected in t} = φ := P{susceptible node has at least one infected neighbor, and at least one of those infected neighbors transmits the disease in t}:
where θ is the probability that the infected node establishes one link with the susceptible node of interest:
The first term of (1) represents the probability of a susceptible node actively connecting to an infected node and the probability that infection is transmitted. The second term represents the chance of infected nodes actively connecting to the susceptible node and passing on the infection. The third term is negligible as it represents the chance that the two nodes will be active simultaneously. Since ( t) 2 ≈ 0, the probability of two or more susceptible individuals contracting the infection in time t is negligible. Therefore the probability that k susceptible nodes get infected out of a population of S susceptible nodes is given by (
, the chance that more than one susceptible node catches the infection out of S susceptible nodes is very small. Therefore, the probability that one susceptible node gets infected from S susceptible nodes is given by Sφ
It can be easily shown that (see Appendix B for details)
Thus, the CTMC becomes a birth death process with absorbing state 0. The birth rate for state i given by
and death rate
This allows us to write the rate matrix Q:
IV. RESULTS
In this section we investigate the effect of human behavioral response on the epidemic dynamics by studying various properties of the model. We study outbreak probability [34] in Sec. IV A, quasistationary distribution [34] in Sec. IV B, mean epidemic duration in Sec. IV C, and epidemic reemergence probability in Sec. IV D. Calculation of the epidemic threshold and final size of the outbreak is done using mean-field analysis in Sec. IV E. Finally, the accuracy of mean-field theory in predicting the epidemic is discussed in Sec. IV F using Monte Carlo simulations.
A. Probability of an outbreak
Due to the existence of an absorption state in the SIS epidemic CTMC, the epidemic will eventually die out. This can happen in two ways: either the disease never spreads and dies out immediately, or the disease spreads to a significant proportion of nodes and then dies out eventually. The state where a significant proportion of the population becomes infected is termed an outbreak.
Let p i be the probability of an outbreak when the initial number of infected individuals is i. p i can be estimated by replacing the finite state CTMC by a random walk with infinite states and an absorbing state 0 [34] . Let X(t) be an infinite state non-negative random walk process, with absorbing state 0, and birth and death rates given by (2) and (3). For the random walk, at t → ∞ the random walker either will be in state 0 or will be in a nonzero state: Probability of Absorption in state 0 = lim t→∞ P{X(t) = 0}. Absorption probability depends on the initial number of infected nodes. Let z i be the probability of absorption into state 0 when initial number of infected node is i for i = 1,2,3, . . . and z 0 = 1:
Due to the birth death process we can write the following relation:
This recurrence relation can be solved to obtain (see Ref. [35] , Ch. 6) To study the effect of behavioral adaptation due to risk perception factor δ, we numerically calculate this probability for various values of δ in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) . Outbreak probability variation with δ in Fig. 1(a) is very different from that in Fig. 1(b) . For lower values of β μ ratio and lower activity levels a h and a inf , even a small quantity of risk perception factor (δ) can completely stop the epidemic, whereas, for a relatively higher β μ ratio and larger activity levels, a high risk perception factor is unable to stop the epidemic.
B. Quasistationary probability distribution
The epidemic will eventually die out, however, in the event of an outbreak, the epidemic appears to enter a stable equilibrium before dying out. Thus, in the preextinction stage the probability distribution of the epidemic approaches a stationary distribution. This distribution is called quasistationary probability distribution [34] . Let q i (t) be the probability of the event that number of infected nodes = i at time t, conditioned on the event that epidemic has not died till time t. Formally,
We use the approach in Ref. [34] to calculate the quasistationary distribution. It is possible to show
whereQ is the same as matrix Q with the first row and column removed and q is the column vector of probabilities q i :
This equation cannot be solved directly; however, it can be solved iteratively [36, 37] . Approximating the quasistationary distribution is a well-studied problem, and several approximations have been proposed [36] [37] [38] . We use a simple approximation proposed in Ref. [37] to calculate the quasistationary distribution. This approximation assumes d 1 = 0; i.e., we remove the absorbing state 0 from the CTMC. Figure 2 shows a good fit between the approximation and the exact calculation.
C. Duration of the epidemic
The duration of the epidemic is the time until the process hits the zero absorption state [39] . The duration of the epidemic depends on the initial number of infected nodes. Let T i be the duration of the epidemic when initial number of infected nodes is i. Clearly T 0 = 0.
By obtaining the mean and higher order moments of T i , we can study the effect of the adaptive behavior on the epidemic duration. To obtain the mean and higher order moments, we first calculate the probability generating function (PGF) of T i . The PGF of T i is given by G i (z) = E[z (T i ) ] Due to the birth death process, we can write the following recurrence relation:
After simplification we get
and mean durationT i = dG i (z) dz |z = 1. The above equation then becomes
This can be written in matrix form as B ·T = −1 whereT is the column vector with elementsT i and 1 is a column vector of ones and
Matrix B is irreducibly diagonally dominant; hence the system of equations will have a unique solution [40] . We calculate the expected duration numerically and study its variation with risk perception factor δ in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) . We find a large variation in mean duration with δ for a lower β μ ratio and activity levels. In such a regime, adaptive behavior can cause considerable reduction of epidemic duration. However, in the scenario of high β μ ratio and activity levels, adaptive behavior causes very little variation in the epidemic duration.
D. Epidemic reemergence
In the event of an epidemic, the government can respond by temporarily closing schools, churches, shopping centers, and places where large numbers of people congregate. Such measures can successfully stop the epidemic. However, the disease can resurface and cause another epidemic if these measures are not enforced for sufficient duration, i.e., till the disease is eradicated from the community and thus does not get a chance to reappear. Here we calculate the probability of epidemic reemergence when such decrees have been lifted.
We assume that the local administration enforces epidemic containment policies if the epidemic hits a threshold value I th . Furthermore, we assume that such policies cause the activity level of both the healthy and the infected to drop to zero. Since the implementation of these policies is temporary, we assume that life returns to normal after a time duration D, causing interaction levels to shoot up to their preepidemic values.
After the epidemic containment policy is enforced, birth rate b i = 0, and therefore the rate matrix Q of the CTMC I (t) can be written as P{No epidemic outbreak} is calculated in Sec. IV A. Substituting it in the above equation we get P{Epidemic reemergence after duration D}
Let p(t) be a column vector of probabilities p i (t).
From the Markov property,
where P(D) is the transition probability matrix. From the Kolmogorov equations we get
whose solution is given by
Thus P(D) = e Q·D . We calculate p(D) using numerical methods. In Fig. 4 we plot the variation of epidemic reemergence probability with duration D, for various values of recovery rate μ. This analysis allows one to calculate the appropriate duration of measures implemented to prevent epidemic reemergence.
E. Mean-field analysis
Mean-field analysis is a very useful tool to understand epidemic behavior. Here we aim to study the size of the outbreak using mean-field theory. A mean-field equation of the epidemic process can be written from first principles or can be derived from the Kolmogorov equations [34] . The mean-field equation is a deterministic ordinary differential equation describing the evolution of the mean number of infected individualsĪ (t). The mean-field equation for an activity-driven model can be written as follows [31] :
The first term represents the reduction in infections due to recovery, the second term describes the rise in infections due to susceptible individuals contacting infected individuals, while the final term represents the increase of infections when infected individuals contact susceptible individuals. Figure 5 compares the evolution of the epidemic predicted by mean-field analysis with the one predicted by calculating the mean of the CTMC. This is compared with data obtained from Monte Carlo simulation of the epidemic.
Threshold
SIS epidemic displays a phase transition behavior, where, above the β μ threshold, the infected population is nonzero, while below the threshold it is zero. We calculate the threshold when δ = 0, i.e., in the absence of adaptations. Dividing (5) by N we get
whereī =Ī /N.
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Thus we obtain a linear ODE. Clearly,ī > 0 if and only if μ < βma h + βma inf . Thus
where R 0 is the basic reproductive number. R 0 > 1 results in a nonzero infected population, while if R 0 1, then the primary infection does not cause an epidemic outbreak. Now we calculate the threshold condition for δ > 0. Consider the following Lyapunov function: V (t) =ī(t), wherē i(t) =Ī (t)/N. At t → 0,ī 2 ≈ 0. Therefore, At early time,ī ≈ī 0 . Thus if the above condition is true for i 0 , then it holds for allī > i 0 . Notice that by putting δ = 0 we can recover (7). Thus we get four cases:
(1)
In the first case since R 0 1, there will be no epidemic. In the second case, if for a givenī 0 , δ is sufficiently large such that case 2 holds then epidemic will die down. In case 3, for given risk perception factor δ, there will be an epidemic outbreak; however, in this regime, there exists aδ > δ such that β μ 1 ma h e −δNī 0 +ma inf , which can stop the epidemic. This shows that adaptive behavior can prevent an epidemic. However, the prevention strategy has its limits, as seen by case 4. If the condition in case 4 is satisfied, then even δ → ∞ is unable to stop the epidemic.
Size of outbreak
When the epidemic enters a steady state the rate of change of infected individuals is zero. Thus the size of outbreak in steady state can be obtained by setting the right-hand side of (5) to 0:
This is a fixed point equation whose solution will give the size of outbreak in steady state. In Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) we plot the size of outbreak versus the risk perception factor δ. Outbreak size falls rapidly with increase in δ for the system parameters in Fig. 6(a) . However, for the system parameters in Fig. 6 on outbreak size depends on system parameters which are governed by the disease and lifestyle patterns.
F. Accuracy of mean-field theory
We study the accuracy of mean-field theory in predicting the final size of the epidemic by comparing it with the final size of the epidemic obtained from Monte Carlo simulation. The same is also done for the average infected individuals obtained from the CTMC distribution. Results are illustrated in Fig. 7 . In general, final size of the epidemic obtained from mean-field approximation is less accurate than the one calculated from the CTMC. Accuracy of both mean-field theory increases with β μ . This can be understood as follows: for a β μ ratio just above the threshold, there is a significant chance that there will be no epidemic outbreak. This is not captured by mean-field theory, and hence it overestimates the epidemic size.
V. DISCUSSION
Our analysis suggests the existence of a threshold condition which governs the effectiveness of human adaptive behavior for stemming the epidemic. Since this threshold condition is applicable only on populations with adaptive behavior hence we term this as "adaptive threshold." For given activity levels, when ratio of infection probability and the recovery rate β μ are below the adaptive threshold, exponential activity reduction can successfully prevent an epidemic, while the lack of activity reduction results in an epidemic outbreak. But, if β μ ratio is above the threshold, then exponential activity reduction strategy is unable to stop the epidemic. Thus, human behavioral response to the epidemic can be effective in preventing the epidemic only under conditions outlined in Sec. IV E1.
The existence of an adaptive threshold is supported by the analysis of outbreak probability, mean duration of the epidemic, and mean-field stability analysis. From Fig. 1(a) it is clear that a small increase in risk perception factor δ results into a sharp drop in outbreak probability, while in Fig. 1(b) even a large value of risk perception factor δ is unable to reduce the outbreak probability. We see β μ = 0.269 in Fig. 1(a) while Fig. 1(b) . This suggests the existence of a critical value of β μ above which behavior changes are unable to stop the epidemic. In Fig. 8 we plot the outbreak probability versus ratio is above the adaptive threshold, an increase in risk perception has a limited effect on the epidemic. The primary reason for this behavior is the nonzero activity level of the infected population. A nonzero activity level enables infected individuals to connect with healthy populace, thus sustaining the epidemic. Thus, if the activity level of infected individuals a inf = 0, from (5) we get lim δ→∞Ī (t) = 0. Thus, if a inf = 0, then an increase in the risk perception factor can quickly kill the epidemic.
We suspected that populations with heterogeneous activity levels may also display an adaptive threshold behavior. In order to test our intuitions we ran extensive simulations. The activity levels of individuals were assumed to be distributed as a power law, i.e., activity of node i = a i = a h P (x) where P (x) ∝ x −γ . If a healthy node becomes infected, then we assume that its activity level reduces by a factor of 4. Susceptible nodes reduce their activity level exponentially as described in Sec. II. In Fig. 9 through extensive simulations, we plot outbreak size versus epidemic. This suggests an existence of an adaptive threshold for populations with heterogeneous activity patterns.
Previous studies [19, 21, 23] have reported the existence of a similar threshold condition. In these models, the susceptibility β of individuals changes due to awareness of the epidemic. Authors in Ref. [19] report the existence of a critical value of risk perception factor beyond which the disease dies out; thus they conclude that adequate precautions taken by healthy population can stop the epidemic. Studies [21, 23] also report the existence of a similar threshold condition which is dependent on fear or awareness parameters of the disease. If we assume that individuals modify their interaction patterns as opposed to reducing susceptibility, then as illustrated by our study, this conclusion may not be true. Even if the healthy population reduce their interaction patterns (exponentially), a nonzero activity level of the infected population can still sustain the epidemic. Thus, for an asymptomatic disease, it is important to incentivize infected individuals for limiting their activity level.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have investigated the effect of human behavioral adaptations on SIS epidemic dynamics for a population whose connection structure varies with time. We considered a scenario where the disease is asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic, making selective contact avoidance impossible. Thus, human behavioral response to the disease results from awareness campaigns and advisories provided by government and the media. We modeled the epidemic as a CTMC, which enabled us to perform a full stochastic analysis. Our investigations on the effect of risk perception on outbreak probability and mean duration of the epidemic suggest an existence of an "adaptive threshold." If the ratio of spreading probability to recovery rate is below the threshold, then human behavioral response can prevent an epidemic; however, if it is above the threshold, then human behavioral response is unable to suppress the epidemic. This result has implications on epidemic containment policies. Epidemic awareness campaigns can be effective only if the interaction patterns of the infected population are limited. Thus, incentives must be provided to the diseased population to keep their interaction levels to minimum possible values. Additionally, administrative authorities may consider closing schools, airports, supermarkets, etc., to limit interactions. Such measures are temporary, and eventually things must return to normalcy. This may trigger another epidemic outbreak as all diseased individuals may not have recovered. This motivated us to calculate the probability of epidemic reemergence when the said policy is applied for a fixed duration.
Our study does not consider the role of culture and ethnicity in human behavior. We assumed that all healthy individuals will exhibit the same response to the epidemic, which may not be correct in situations where culture and ethnicity shape the response to an epidemic. This work can be extended to include the effect of varied response to the epidemic. Another extension would be to capture the effect of seasonal variations in activity patterns resulting from school vacations, holidays, etc. We plan to explore these avenues in the near future.
APPENDIX A
P{Infected node recovers in t} = μ t. Let A be the event that an infected node does not recover in duration T . P{A} = (1 − μ t) T / t . Since t → 0, this quantity becomes e −μT . Now, if the same node recovers and again becomes infected, then the event that it does not recover in time T is independent of event A and is given by e −μT . Thus, the interrecovery times have exponential distribution and are independent, and therefore the recovery process is a Poisson process.
APPENDIX B
P{I (t + t) = i + 1|I (t) = i} = P{One infection and no recovery in time t}, since the chance of more than one infection and recovery is negligible. Now, P{one infection and a recovery in t} = P{one infection in t}P{one recovery in t} = (Sφ + o( t))(μ t + o( t)) = φμ t + o( t), which is negligible as t 2 ≈ 0. Therefore, P{one infection and a recovery in t} ≈ P{one infection in t}.
Hence, P{I (t + t) = i + 1|I (t) = i} = Sφ + o( t) = (N − i)φ + o( t).
Using similar arguments it can be shown that P{I (t + t) = i − 1|I (t) = i} = iμ t + o( t). 
